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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CLAIMS
Erwin Chemerinsky*
I. INTRODUCTION
This morning I will be talking about procedural due process. The
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide that neither the federal
or state government can deprive a person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.'
As you know, the Supreme Court has interpreted these two
clauses of the Constitution as giving rise to a couple of doctrines,
substantive due process and procedural due process. Substantive
due process concerns whether the government has an adequate
reason for taking away a person's life, liberty or property. While
procedural due process, which is my focus, concerns whether the
government has followed adequate procedures in taking away a
person's life, liberty or property.
All procedural due process questions can be broken down into
three sub-issues. First, is there a deprivation? Only if there is a
deprivation does the court need to go any further in its procedural
due process analysis. Second, is there a deprivation of life, liberty
or property? Only if a person is deprived of life, liberty or
property does the court need to proceed with a procedural due
process analysis. Third, what procedures are required? Only if the
procedures of the government are inadequate is there a deprivation
of due process. The combination of these three sub-issues, phrased
somewhat differently, is that there is a denial of procedural due
process only if there is a deprivation of life, liberty or property
without adequate procedures.
In any given case, as few as one or possibly all three of these
might be at issue, but, the three steps are analytically alvays
present in procedural due process cases. I will deal with these
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Law and Policitcal Science, University of
Southern California Law School. This article is based on a transcript of remarks
given at the Practicing Law Institute program on Section 1983 Civil Rights
Litigation.
1 See, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part that: "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... " Id; N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6. This
provision states that: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." Id.
1
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three questions individually. First, is there a deprivation; second,
does the deprivation constitute a deprivation of life, liberty or
property; and third, what procedures are required?
II. DEPRIVATION
As to the first question of whether this is a deprivation, usually
this is clear. Often, it is obvious from the fact that the person has
lost life, liberty or property. However, sometimes the issue is
litigated and most frequently two questions arise.
One is what mental state is required in order to have a
deprivation? The key Supreme Court case here is Daniels v.
Williams2 from 1986. Daniels involved a prisoner who slipped on
a pillow that had been negligently left on a prison step? He sued
the prison officials, claiming that their negligence had deprived
him of his liberty, his bodily safety, without due process of law."
The Supreme Court ruled that negligence is insufficient to state a
claim under the due process clause.' The court said generally, not
just in the prison context, negligence is insufficient to have a
constitutional deprivation.
The companion case decided with Daniels was Davidson v.
Cannon , which involved a prisoner who was threatened by
another prisoner.' The prisoner left a note for the warden saying,
"I've been threatened. I need protection."9  Subsequently, the
warden left on a long weekend and did not do anything to provide
protection.' The prisoner was assaulted by the prisoner who
2 474 U.S. 327 (1986). The Court revisited Parratt v. Taylor, where the Court
determined that "the alleged loss, even though negligently caused amounted to a
deprivation." Id at 328. (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)).3Id. at 328.
4Id.
51d. at 332.
6 Id. at 328. The Court concluded that the Due Process Clause is not triggered
when an official's negligent act causes "unintended loss of or injury to life,
liberty, or property." Id.
7 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
81d. at 345.
9 Id. The Court took no further action, aside from writing the note to inform
prison authorities of the danger of an attack, petitioner did not ask to be put into
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threatened him and was significantly injured." The case arose in
Connecticut where the prisoner had no state law remedies against
the prison officials 2, so the prisoner said, "In order to be able to
get any remedy, I need to be able to bring the constitutional
claim.""3  The Supreme Court said, as it did in Daniels, the
prisoner here has alleged only negligence which is insufficient for
a claim under the due process clause.'4
Interestingly, the Supreme Court did not return to this issue of
mental state for twelve years, until 1998, when it decided County
of Sacramento v. Lewis. 5 Lewis involved a high speed police
chase. 6 As is often the case with high speed chase cases, the chase
ended in tragedy. One police officer misunderstood another police
officer and gave chase to a boy on a motorcycle. 7 The chase
ended in a crash and a passenger on the motorcycle, a teenage boy,
died as a result of the accident."8
The issue concerned what test was to be used in order to
establish liability in the high speed chase context' 9 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that deliberate
indifference was the proper test to meet Daniels and Davidson."
However, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
reversed the Ninth Circuit.21 Writing for the Court, Justice Souter
said that, in an emergency situation such as this, the government is
liable only if its officers' behavior, "shocks the conscience."- In
order to demonstrate that the government officers' behavior shocks
" Id at 346.
12 Id
13474 U.S. at 348 (1986).
14 d at 347. The Court held in Daniels that Due Process Clause protections,
substantive or procedural, are not activated when prison officials act with lack of
due care. Id at 348.
15 523 U.S. 833 (1998).16 Jd at 837.
7I at 836.
'1 d at 837.
19Id at 839. (granting certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the
Circuits regarding the level of culpability of the officers of law enforcement
when Substantive Due Process is violated in a pursuit case).
201d at 838.
21 523 U.S. at 855 (1998).
221d at 854. The Court determined that Deputy Smith's actions failed to meet
the shocks-the-conscience standard. Id. at 855.
2000 873
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the conscience it must be proven that the officers acted with the
intent of causing harm to the victims."' Notice how difficult that
standard is to meet. It has to be shown that the police officers gave
chase not to apprehend the individual, but with the motive of
causing harm to the victims. 4
There are two things that I think are essential to understanding
Lewis, with regard to mental state. First, the court makes clear that
in emergency situations the standard is shocks the conscience."
This standard applies not just in high speed chase cases, but in any
emergency context. Justice Souter said that deliberate indifference
is the appropriate standard if the circumstances allow the
opportunity for deliberation. 6 But if it is an emergency, there is
not the chance for reflection, then shocks the conscience is the
required mental state that must be used. 7  Second, the clear
implication is that in nonemergency situations deliberate
indifference is sufficient to state a claim under due process. 8 In
fact, my previous examples illustrate that this is what the lower
courts have been saying ever since Daniels and Davidson.
Stemler2 9 and Hill" both held that deliberate indifference or
recklessness would be sufficient to state a claim under due process,
but negligence would not.3 Most of the lower courts, though not
all, have gone in the direction of the Davis case,3" that gross
negligence is also insufficient.3
This seems to me to be a matter of using the right words in
pleading if you are the plaintiff. You want to allege intent if it is
there. If it is a non-emergency situation, allege deliberate





27 523 U.S. at 854 (1998). The Court determined that when unanticipated
circumstances require an officer's instant assessment, even abrupt recklessness
falls short of harmful purpose required to shock the conscience. Id. at 853.
21Id. at 851.
29 126 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 1997).
30 93 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 1996).
311 dat 421, Stemler, 126 F.3d at 868.
32 90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996).
33 1d at 1353.
[Vol 16
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gross negligence. Now, if it is an emergency situation, then you
have to allege shocks the conscience and then try to meet the very
difficult standard announced in Lewis.
The second issue that sometimes comes up with regard to
whether there is a deprivation is often referred to as the Parratt v.
Taylor u issue; Are the existence of state procedures sufficient to
prevent a finding of a deprivation?"
Parratt, a 1981 Supreme Court case, involved a Nebraska
prisoner who had a hobby kit that was worth about $23 lost by the
prison?' He sued the prison officials, saying that their negligence
had caused the loss of the hobby kit and that therefore he was
deprived of his property without due process. 7 The Supreme
Court said that section 1983 does not have a mental state
requirement, so negligence was sufficient." Notice that five years
later in Daniels v. Williams 9 the Supreme Court said due process
does have a mental state requirement and negligence is not
sufficient.
4
What is important about Parratt to this day is that the Court's
opinion, by then Justice Rehnquist, said there was no denial of due
process.4! ' Rehnquist stated that all the inmate was seeking is a
post-deprivation remedy.42 The prisoner was not saying he should
have been given notice and a hearing before his hobby kit was lost.
Rather, he is seeking a post-deprivation remedy and compensation
for the loss.43 Rehnquist said that here Nebraska provided an
adequate post-deprivation remedy.' In other words, the court says
that where an individual is seeking a post-deprivation remedy and
the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy, then it
34 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
3-Id at 542.
36Id at 529.
37 1d (seeking to recover their value, respondent sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
3I Id at 534-35.
39 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 327.
41M at 330-31.41 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 542. The Court concluded that respondent was deprived
of his property under state law, however, the deprivation was not the result of an
instituted state procedure, therefore, alleged no violation of the Due Process
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cannot be said that the government has denied the individual of
due process.45
Well, immediately commentators recognized that Parratt could
be extended very broadly, potentially to all constitutional claims
because the Bill of Rights is applied to state and local governments
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. All
anyone sueing for damages is ever seeking is some remedy after
the loss, and so long as the state provides some remedy it then can
be said there is no denial of due process? Would not Parratt
extended this far, in essence, undermine Monroe v. Pape,46 by
requiring that a plaintiff always has to use state remedies whenever
you are trying to vindicate a constitutional right in any kind of due
process situation?"7 Some lower courts, most notably the Fifth
Circuit, began to take Parratt in that direction.
The Supreme Court returned to Parratt a short time later in
Hudson v. Palmer,"8 which also involved a prisoner. In this case
prison officials intentionally destroyed the prisoner's property by
ripping down posters from his walls and destroying his personal
possessions. 9
The Supreme Court said once more that there was no denial of
due process because the inmate was seeking only a post-
deprivation remedy. Since, the state provided an adequate post-
deprivation remedy, there was no deprivation of due process.5 In
essence, Hudson extends Parratt from the negligent deprivation
situation to the intentional deprivation circumstances. 2
The key case limiting Parratt, in fact the only case which has
since clarified Parratt in a majority opinion, is Zinermon v.
Burch.3 In Zinermon, the Supreme Court tried very hard to add
45 Id. The Court held that. remedies were available to fully compensate the
respondent for his loss of property, which are sufficient to fulfill the Due
Process requirements. Id. at 544.
46 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
47 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544.
48 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
49 Id. at 520. Petitioners discovered a torn pillowcase in respondent's cell and
charged him with the destruction of state property. Id. at 544.
50 id.
5' 468 U.S. at 533.
5 2 
Id.
53 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
[Vol 16
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clarity to an area where there was enormous confusion among the
lower courts. Zinermon involved an individual who voluntarily
committed himself to an institution' He later sued the state
officials who had committed him, claiming that they should have
recognized that he was not competent to commit himself
voluntarily and that therefore they should have provided him due
process, notice and hearing, as would be required in the
involuntary commitment situation." The mental hospital official
responded by saying that pursuant to Parratt, there is no
deprivation of due process and that the case should be dismissed
out on that ground. The United States Supreme Court held that
Parratt was inapplicable, stating that Parralt only applies in
limited circumstances.
Let me highlight the four that I think are most important. First,
the Court says Parratt applies only if the individual is seeking
solely a post-deprivation remedy.' If what the individual is
complaining about is the lack of pre-deprivation due process, then
Parratt is inapplicable 9 In this instance the individual was
saying, "I should have been given notice in a hearing before I was
committed." That is arguing that there was not adequate pre-
deprivation due process. He was not just seeking a post-
deprivation remedy, thus Parratt is inapplicable.6
Second, and I think most important, Parratt applies only to
random and unauthorized acts by government officials.' It does
not apply if what is involved is an official government policy.
That tremendously limits Parratt. Many courts have expressly
invoked this distinction between unauthorized acts and government
policy. Random and unauthorized acts are the acts of the
4 Id at 123. (alleging he was disoriented and medicated when he signed the
forms for admission to treatment at t state mental hospital in Florida, he brought
suit on the ground of denial of Due Process of law). Id. at 115.55 id
6Id at 115.
5 7 1d. at 139. The Court held that the complaint was adequate to state a claim
for violation of Due Process under § 1983. Id.5 1Id at 129.
59 494 U.S. at 136 (1990).
60Id at 115.
61Id at 114.
62 Id at 129. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
2000 877
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individual, whereas government policy seems quite like the
definition of what is required in order to establish municipal
liability. For instance Moore v. Board of Education,63 a more
recent and well-reasoned case, the Court of Appeals said that
Zinermon makes clear that Parratt only applies to random and
unauthorized acts.'
A third important limitation in Zinermon is that Parratt only
applies in the procedural due process context and not with respect
to substantive due process claims.'3 If the person is complaining of
inadequate procedure, for example, lack of adequate notice and
hearing, then there is the possibility of a Parratt claim. However,
if it is a substantive due process claim where the person is saying,
"The government acted without adequate justification," then
Parratt is not applicable.' The final part of Zinermon I should
emphasize is that Parratt only applies if the state provides
adequate procedures. 7 In other words, if there are not adequate
remedies at the state level, then Parratt would be inapplicable.
Now, what is enough to make the state procedures inadequate?
There is no Supreme Court case on point here. There is a large
body of lower court cases that are relevant here.
A case that is particularly well written and thoroughly reasoned
is Pena v. Mattox. s The principle established in Pena is that if the
state is itself taking action to prevent use of the state remedies,
63 134 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1998).
64 Moore, 134 F.3d at 785 (explaining that
[c]ases in which a due process challenge is made to deprivations
resulting from the enforcement of an established state procedure stand in
sharp contrast to Parratt and Hudson cases. In such cases, the actions at
issue are not random or unauthorized, and it is both practical and feasible
for the state to provide pre-deprivation process to the aggrieved party.
Id. (citing Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353 (6th Cir. 1993)).
65 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 139 (stating that "this case does not represent the
special instance of the Mathews due process analysis where postdeprivation
process is all that is due because no predeprivation safeguards would be of use
in preventing the kind of deprivation alleged").
6 But see, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
67Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125.
68 84 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1996).
878 [Vol 16
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then adequate state remedies are not available.69 Pena involved the
police conspiring with the mother of a child to put the child up for
adoption over the father's objections and the police themselves
arrested the father so he could not use state procedures to protect
his rights."
The Court of Appeals said that since the government officials
were preventing the use of the state procedures, under those
circumstances adequate state procedures are were not available."
Now, for those of you who represent defendants, I would still
pay careful attention to Parratt. I think there is a real chance that
the Supreme Court and some Courts of Appeals are going to go
back to Parratt and expand it. For instance, Justice Kennedy in a
concurring opinion in Albright v. Oliver,' a 1994 Supreme Court
case in which the court said that malicious prosecution claims had
been brought under the Fourth Amendment, said this issue should
be analyzed under Parrat.'
In addition, there are a number of Fifth Circuit cases, several
written by Judge Edith Jones, that try to revitalize Parratt. If you
represent plaintiffs, I think you have to be on the lookout for
Parratt being used to defeat your claim and try to rely on
Zinermon as a limit on Parratt.
III. LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY
Assuming there is a deprivation, the analysis goes on to the
second question. Is the deprivation of life, liberty or property?
Prior to the late 1960s, the Supreme Court drew a distinction
between rights and privileges for the purposes of analyzing
whether there was life, liberty or property. The Supreme Court
used to say that a person had a liberty or property interest only if
69 Id at 898 (explaining that "...a defendant who prevents a plaintiff from
exhausting his state judicial remedies should not be allowed to set up the
plaintiff's failure to exhaust as a defense").
70 1id
71 Id
72 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
73 Albright, 510 U.S. at 285-86 (stating that "[g]iven the state remedy and the




Chemerinsky: Procedural Due Process Claims
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
TOURO LAWREVIEW
there was a right. If it was just a privilege, then there was no
liberty or property interest and the government did not have to
provide due process. Up until the late 1960s the Supreme Court
and the lower courts would say that working for the government is
a privilege, not a right, so the government does not have to provide
due process if it fires somebody or that government benefit
programs are privileges, not rights. Therefore, no due process is
required for termination of benefits.
Goldberg v. Kelly' is the key Supreme Court case that departs
from that analysis. In Goldberg, the Court held that welfare
benefits are property and that therefore the government has to
provide due process before it can terminate receipt of benefits."
The question after Goldberg is how is it determined whether a
property or liberty interest existed?
There are two different ways of reading Goldberg. One is that
the importance of the interest determines whether it is a liberty or
property interest.76 If the interest or benefit is significant enough,
then there is a liberty or propert interest. The other approach
focuses on whether a reasonable expectation to continued receipt
of the benefit existed.' If the government has taken affirmative
steps in providing a benefit, thus giving a person a reasonable
expectation of continued receipt of the benefit, then a property or
liberty interest exists.
Each of these approaches raises different questions for litigation.
In the former situation, how do we decide whether the interest is
important enough? In the latter situation, will it suffice that the
74 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
75Id. at 264. Agreeing with the District Court that
the stakes are simply too high for the welfare recipient, and the
possibility for honest error or irritable misjudgment too great, to allow
termination of aid without giving the recipient a chance, if he so desires,
to be fully informed of the case against him so that he may contest its
basis and produce evidence in rebuttal. Id. at 666.
76 Id. at 262 (explaining that "constitutional restraints apply as much to the
withdrawal of public assistance benefits as to disqualification for unemployment
compensation; or to denial of a tax exemption; or to discharge from public
employment").
77 Id. at 264 (stating that "termination of aid pending resolution of a
controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means
by which to live while he waits").
880 [Vol 16
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government could prevent formation of a property interest or
liberty interest just by saying, "Do not expect that you're going to
continue to receive this," thus just by denying the reasonable
expectation?
In Board of Regents of State Colleges Et. al. v. Roth , the court
returned to this and clarified its approach. Roth involved an
individual who worked for the University of Wisconsin system on
a year-to-year contract?9 Each contract made it clear that he
should have no expectation that the contract would be renewed.
The contract was not renewed and he sued claiming that he was
deprived of a property interest and he should be given due process
regarding the non-renewal.0 The Supreme Court said he had no
reasonable expectation to continued receipt of the property. In
Roth the Supreme Court said that no longer is the rights/privileges
distinction to be used,8 instead the question of whether somebody
has a property interest is whether there is a reasonable expectation
to continued receipt of a benefit."
The court extended this to liberty in Paul v. Davis,3 which
involved Louisville, Kentucky's practice of posting shoplifters'
pictures in department stores." An individual's picture was
wrongly posted and he sued, saying that the government had
deprived him of his liberty and his reputation without due
process." The Supreme Court said that reputation by itself is not a
liberty interest." In fact, in Siegert v. Gilley' the Supreme Court
m 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
79 id
so Id at 569 (claiming that "the failure of University officials to give him
notice of any reason for nonretention and an opportunity for a hearing violated
his right to procedural due process of law").
81 Id
82Id at 577 (explaining that "It is a purpose of the ancient institution of
property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives,
reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined").
83474 U.S. 693 (1976).
84id
s5 d at 698 (asserting "that he had been deprived of rights secured to him by
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution").86 Id at 701 (explaining that reputation alone is not by itself sufficient to
invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause).
7 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
2000
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reaffirmed Paul.8" The Supreme Court said that harm to reputation
by itself is not a loss of liberty."
This remains the analysis to this day with regard to whether there
is a property or liberty interest. You have to look the Constitution,
federal statutes, state constitutions, and state laws to determine
whether there is a reasonable expectation.
Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation"° is a recent
case that illustrates this. The issue raised is whether or not
government employment is a property interest so that a person has
to be given notice and a hearing before being fired.9 In 1999, the
Federal Circuit said that the government had given the individual a
reasonable expectation that the job would be his or hers. so when
the government takes it away, the government has to provide due
process.9'
For those of you who represent defendants, you can often
prevent a property interest from vesting by making sure that there
is no expectation to continued receipt of the benefit. A Supreme
Court case in the 1970s, Bishop v. Wood,93 makes clear that the
government, by preventing expectations, can render a plaintiffs
claim useless.94 On the other hand, if you represent the plaintiff,
you are going to want to look at all of the circumstances, in
arguing that the government's actions have created a reasonable
expectation to continued receipt of the benefit.
There is one major exception to this analysis and that is prisoner
litigation. Initially the Supreme Court applied Goldberg, Roth and
Paul to prisoner litigation, saying that whether a prisoner has,
especially a liberty interest but a property interest as well, depends
8 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
89 Siegert, 500 U.S. at 234 (affirming that "[o]ur decision in Paul v. Davis did
not turn, however, on the state of mind of the defendant, but on the lack of any
constitutional protection for the interest in reputation").
90 179 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
9' Stone, 179 F.3d at 1374 (stating that "[i]f Mr. Stone does possess such a
property interest, then the government cannot deprive him of this property
without due process").
92 id.
9' 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
94 Id. at 345 (explaining that the "North Carolina Supreme Court has held that
an enforceable expectation of continued public employment in that State can
exist only if the employer, by statute or contract, has actually granted some form
of guarantee"). Id. (citing Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971)).
882 [Vol 16
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upon whether the government has created a reasonable
expectation.
In Hewitt v. Helms,95 the Supreme Court expressly says that,
determining whether or not a prisoner has a liberty or property
interest depends on whether the government has given a reasonable
expectation to continued receipt of the benefit." There then were a
number of Supreme Court cases, and hundreds of lower court cases
analyzing particular circumstances to determine whether the
government had given a reasonable expectation to continued
receipt of the benefit. Various cases involved good time credits,
parole revocation, revocation of visiting privileges and so on and
each case decided whether the regulations of the prison or the
statutes of the state or federal law created a reasonable expectation.
In 1995, the Supreme Court, however, completely changed the
analysis in Sandin v. Conner.9 Sandin involved prison officials in
Hawaii who wanted to subject a prisoner to a body cavity search
and he objected vociferously." As a result of his objection, the
prison decided to place him in disciplinary segregation for several
days.9 He argued that he should be given due process, notice, and
a hearing before he's placed in disciplinary segregation."°
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that he should have been given procedural due process, reasoning
that the Hawaii prison regulations provide that in order to put
somebody in disciplinary segregation, there has to be substantial
evidence."' The court said this means that you have a reasonable
expectation to not having disciplinary segregation without there
being substantial evidence which requires notice and a hearing. '
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, in a
five-four decision." Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, said that the analysis under Hewitt, Goldberg, and Roth was
95 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
96 id
97 515 U.S. 472 (1995). It should be noted that the author was co-counsel in
the Supreme Court in Sandin.
98 Id at 475.
99 Id
'0°Id at 476.
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not working well in the prison context."'° Rehnquist said it has led
to a large number of frivolous suits by prisoners, including his
favorite example of the prisoner who sued and said due process
should have been given before a bag lunch was substituted for a
hot lunch."5
Second, and I think more significantly, Rehnquist said that the
effect of the due process analysis was to give prisons an incentive
to not write regulations." If prisons wrote regulations, they then
would create reasonable expectations that would give rise to liberty
and property interests. However, if prisons did not write
regulations and left it just to the discretion of their officials, then
expectations would not exist. Since it is good to have regulations,
the Supreme Court said this law should not create disincentives to
their being written.
So the Supreme Court in Sandin articulated a new test for when
prisoners have liberty interests. The Supreme Court said a prisoner
is deprived of liberty only if there is the loss of a significant
freedom which is atypical to the usual conditions of
confinement." 7 The Court said here that placing a prisoner in
disciplinary segregation did not constitute a loss of liberty because
that was not atypical to the usual conditions of confinement.'°
In fact, in Sandin v. Conner the Supreme Court cited only two
cases where it had previously found prisoners to have liberty
interests under the standard."°9 One was Vitek v. Jones which held
that prisoners are deprived of liberty if they're transferred from
prisons to mental institutions." ° The other case was Washington v.
"4 d.
1'5Id. at 483 (citing Burgin v. Nix, 899 F.2d 733, 735, (8th Cir. 1990)
claiming that there is a "liberty interest in receiving a tray lunch rather than a
sack lunch").
106 id
07Id at 477-78 (citing Wolff v. McDonnel, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)).
log Id
09 See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210 (1990).
"e Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493 (concluding that "a convicted felon also is entitled to
the benefit of procedures appropriate in the circumstances before he is found to
have a mental disease and transferred to a mental hospital").
[Vol 16
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Harper, which held that prisoners have a liberty interest in not
being given antipsychotic medication without their consent."'
There is no doubt in the lower courts that Sandin dramatically
narrows the situations in which prisoners can bring due process
claims.' 2  However, the Supreme Court has not, except in one
instance, referred to Sandin or dealt with Sandin issues since
1995."' Thus there is an enormous amount of confusion in the
lower courts.
There are many lower court decisions that consider disciplinary
segregation situations which seem to find that even very, very long
periods of time in disciplinary segregation do not constitute a
deprivation of liberty."4 In a case from New York, Delaney v.
Selsky"5, a prisoner was placed in disciplinary segregation for one
hundred and ninty-seven days and yet the federal district court said
under Sandin that was not a deprivation of liberty that requires due
process."6
Even further, is Bonner v. Parke"-, a case in Indiana where the
prisoner was placed in disciplinary segregation for three years and
the Federal District Court said under Sandin that is not a
deprivation of liberty without due process."' My sense, in having
read a large number of these post-Sandin cases, is that they seem to
draw a distinction between occurrences in the prison and out of the
prison. If the case involves what the prison is doing within it, then
"' Washington, 494 U.S. at 229 (determining that "[t]he forcible injection of
medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial
interference with that person's liberty").
112 ERWVIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 7.3 at 445 (1997) (explaining that "[A]fter Sandin v. Conner, a statute or
regulation creates a liberty interest for prisoners only if it 'imposes atypical and
significant hardship...in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life'").
' Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143 (1997).
114 See, e.g., Weatherall v. Scherbarth, No. 99-1222, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
3076 (10th1 Cir. Feb. 28, 2000); Whitford v. Boglino, No. 97-3715, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 26475 (71 Cir. Oct. 15, 1999).
" 899 F.Supp. 923 (N.D. N.Y. 1995).
16 Id. at 928.
117 918 F.Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
"" Id. at 1270. (holding that "[petitioner's] placement in disciplinary
segregation for three years does not constitute an extreme term of segregation
and, by itself, does not create an atypical and significant hardship in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life").
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courts are very reluctant to find a deprivation of liberty." 9 But if
the case involves somebody's release from prison, their freedom
from the institution, then courts do find that to be a deprivation of
liberty.
120
The question that might immediately come to some of your
minds is what about a work release program? Is that more like an
in-the-prison situation where Sandin applies or is it more like an
out-of-the-prison situation where Sandin does not apply? There is a
split among the circuits as to that very issue.'
The Second Circuit held in the Kim v. Hurston"' that revocation
of a work release program constitutes a deprivation of liberty and it
requires due process", but the Eighth Circuit in Callender v. Souix
City Residential Treatment Facility,' a couple of years ago, held
that 'the revocation of work release does not constitute a
deprivation of liberty and therefore does not require due
process." This obvious split between the circuits is going to
require resolution by the Supreme Court.
I said there was only one instance since Sandin where the
Supreme Court's returned to this issue and that was in Young v.
Harper.2 6 Young involved a prisoner in the Oklahoma prison
system, which like those in many states, were very overcrowded.
So the Oklahoma prison officials engaged in pre-parole release of
inmates, so that even though the inmate was not yet eligible for
parole they allowed him to go out on pre-parole release.'27
19 See, e.g., Selsky, 899 F.Supp. 923. (holding that confinement in
disciplinary segregation for 197 days is not a deprivation of liberty).120 See, e.g., Young v. Harper, 117 S.Ct. 1148 (1997). (holding that revocation
ofpreparole release is a deprivation of liberty requiring due process).
1 The Second and Eighth Circuits are split regarding the issue of work release
programs.
'22 182 F.3d 113 (2 nd Cir. 1999).
'23 Id. at 119 (stating that "[l]iability ...exist[ed] for the lack of notice of the
...hearing and the failure to inform [the plaintiff of the correct reason for the
removal from the Temporary Release Program.]").
124 88 F.3d 666 (8th Cir. 1996).
'25 Id. at 668 (finding that "[the appellee's] work release program did not
provide the sort of substantial freedom that gives rise to a liberty interest
inherent in the due process clause").
126 Young, 520 U.S. 143.
127 Id. at 145 (explaining that "[Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision
Program] was in effect whenever population of the prison system exceeded 95%
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The inmate was released, he rejoined his family, and he got a
job." Then a bed became available within the prison. The prison
says, "We want you back"'29 and he said, "No, you've got to give
me due process," and obviously due process means more than just
showing that a bed had become available, but showing some
justification for revoking his pre-parole release. 30
The United States Supreme Court unanimously sided with the
prisoner in an opinion by Justice Thomas.' The Supreme Court
held, that once the prison has released the individual from formal
physical custody, whether it's called pre-parole release or parole
release or anything else, then reincarceration is a deprivation of
liberty and the government is going to have to meet all the
requirements of due process."
To me this further reinforces the in-custody/out-of-custody
distinction. If it is about what the prison does with a prisoner in
custody, then the court is very much likely to find that Sandin
applies, and there is no deprivation of liberty. However, if it
involves the release from custody, then the court is much more
likely to find that Sandin is distinguishable.
One exception to that is the prison retaliation case, Hines v.
Gomez,'33 which involves the question of whether Sandin applies if
it is a retaliation situation.' The Ninth Circuit says that if what
of its capacity. An inmate could be placed on preperole after serving 15% of of
his sentence...").
128 Id. at 148 (illustrating that "[h]e kept his own residence, he sought,
obtained and maintained a job; and he lived a life generally free of the incidents
of imprisonment").
129 Id. at 146 (noting that after "five months outside the penetentiary ... the
Govenor of Oklahoma denied [respondent's] parole [and ordered him] to report
back to prison...").
130 Id. (stating that "Respondent filed a petition for a writ of hapeas corpus in
state court complaining that his summary return to prison had deprived him of
liberty without due process").
131 Id. at 147-48 (holding that the pre-parole release was equivalent to parole
as understood in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, thus implying a promise
that pre-parole will not be revoked unless the preparolee fails to live up to the
pre-parole conditions).
32 Id. at 152-53.
133 108 F.3d 265 (9th Cir. 1997).
134 Id. at 267. The court questioned "whether there was substantial evidence
that [the appellant] charged [the appellee] in retaliation for [appellee's] use of
the prison grievance process." The appellant argued that the appellee's
2000
17
Chemerinsky: Procedural Due Process Claims
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
TOURO LAW REVIEW
the prisoner is alleging is improper motive on the part of the
government, then Sandin is distinguishable, and procedural due
process will be required.'35  Mitchell v. Dupnik"' states that
Sandin applies not to pretrial detainees, but only after conviction. 7
Both of these are Ninth Circuit cases and they both distinguish
Sandin v. Conner, which had been a Ninth Circuit case, so it'll be
interesting to see if the Supreme Court goes in that direction.
IV. PROCEDURES
Assuming there is a deprivation, assuming life, liberty or
property, there is then come the third major question. What
procedures are required? I do emphasize the sequence here. If
there is no deprivation of life, liberty or property, then we do not
ever get to the third question in terms of what procedures are
required.
The key case defining what types of procedures are required is
Mathews v. Eldridge.' Mathews involved a question of whether
or not the government had to provide a pre-termination hearing
before cutting off Social Security Disability benefits.'39 The
Supreme Court in Mathews established a three-part balancing test
to determine what procedures are required when there has been a
deprivation of life, liberty or property.'4
First the court says to balance the importance of the interest to
the individual. 4' The more important the interest to the individual,
"punishment of 10-days confinement and television loss did not constitute an
'atytical and significant harship' as required in Sandin v. Conner." Id. at 269.
13 5 Id.
136 75 F.3d 517 (9th Circuit 1996).
137 Id. at 523 (stating that "the Sandin reference to to 'ordinary incidents of
prison life' refers to the ordinary incidents of imprisonment under a sentence
after conviction").
13'424 U.S. 319 (1976).
139 Id. at 323 (determining "whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment requires that prior to the termination of Social Security disability
benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary
hearing").
140 Id. at 335.
141 Id. (stating that the first part of the test is "the private interest that will be
affected by the official action").
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the more procedural protections the court is going to require."2
Second, the court must balance the ability of additional procedures
to increase the accuracy of the fact finding.'43 The ability of
additional procedures to increase the accuracy of the fact finding
asks how likely is it that the additional procedures will reduce the
risk of an erroneous deprivation." Third, the court says it is going
to balance the government's interest in administrative efficiency.'",
The government's interest in administrative efficiency is such that
the more expensive the procedures would be, the less likely it is
that a court will require them."4
As you know, when there is a three-part balancing test like this,
courts have enormous discretion and in all likelihood different
factors will point in varying directions.'47 There is now a very
large body of case law applying Mathews to many different
circumstances, and each considers how the Supreme Court's
balancing test should be applied.4 '
142 CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 451. (noting that "[t]he more important the
interest, the more in the way of procedural safeguards the Court will require").
143 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (setting out the second part of the test as "the risk
of any erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
theprobable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards").
1 CHEMERIMSKY, supra, at 451. (explaining that "[t]he more the Court
believes that the additional procedures will lead to better, more accurate, less
erroneous decisions, the more likely it is that the Court will require them").
'45 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (setting out the third part of the test as "the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirment
would entail").
145 CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 451 (stating that "The more expensive the
procedures will be, the less likely it is that the Court will require them").
147 Id. at 452 (explaining that "[t]he reality is that courts have enormous
discretion in evaluating each of the three factors and especially how to balance
them. Such multi-part balancing inherently provides little constraint on judicial
decisions").
148 See generally Chalkboard, Inc. v. Brandt, 902 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir.
1989). Day care center brought civil rights action against officials of the
Arizona Department of Health Services and the Arizona Department of
Economic Security based upon their actions in summarily suspending day care
center's license. Id. at 1377. Kraemer v. Hecler, 737 F.2d 214, 221 (2nd Cir.
1984). Class action was brought challenging policies and procedures relative to
termination of medicare coverage of medicare Part A beneficiaries. Id. at 214.
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It is important to emphasize that what procedures are required is
entirely a question of law for the judge. It is not a question of fact,
and indeed even more importantly, it is a question of constitutional
law, not a question of state law.'49 This is what Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill teaches us. 50 Loudermill involved a
security guard who was fired.'5' The government came in and said
thet the state law specifies the procedures that are required."''
Earlier, three justices of the Supreme Court in Arnett v. Kennedy 3
said that an individual has to take the bitter with the sweet, that just
as the government can define what's a property interest, so can the
government define what procedures are required. 54 The Supreme
Court in Loudermill rejected that.55
The Supreme Court says the issue of what procedures are
required is an matter of United States constitutional law. 6 The
expectations the government creates can determine whether there
is a property interest or not, but once there is a property interest,
then it is entirely for the courts under the Constitution to decide
what due process requires.5 7
Vitek v. Jones, holds the same thing in the context of liberty.
That it is not for the government to decide what due process
requires, it is for the courts in interpreting the Constitution. 5"
149 Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)




152 Id. at 539 (explaining that "The Parma Board argues.. .the property right is
defined by, and conditioned on, the legislature's choice of procedures for its
deprivation").
15' 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
'14 Id. at 152-54 (noting that "[w]here the grant of a substantive right is
inextricable interwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be
employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must
take the bitter with the sweet").
... Cleveland, 470 U.S. at 541 (stating that "it is settled that the 'bitter with the
sweet' approach misconceives the constitutional guarantee").
156 See, infra, note 153.
'57 Cleveland, 470 U.S. at 541 (explaining that "once it is determined that the
Due Process Clause applies 'the question remains what process is due').
1s Vitek, 445 U.S. at 489 (noting that "[o]nce a state has granted a prisoner a
liberty interest, we held that due process protections are necessary 'to insure that
the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated"').
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Vitek held that a prisoner is deprived of liberty if the prisoner is
transferred from a prison to a mental hospital and the Court said
the determination of due process is for the courts. 5 9
A recent case in this area is City of West Covina v. Perkins."
Perkins involved an individual who owned a home and rented it to
a tenant.16' The police had reason to believe that the tenant had
committed a crime so they obtained a search warrant for the
home. They seized property, including $2,629 in cash that
belonged to the landlord.' At the culmination of the case against
the tenant, the landlord went to the court and demanded his
property back. He went to the court clerk a couple of times and
wrote a letter but received nothing for his efforts.'
The Ninth Circuit said that just as the government has to give an
individualized inventory of what is taken, so does the government
have to give notice as to how you get the property back.'"
However, the Supreme Court in a unanimous decision written by
Justice Kennedy stated that no individual notice has to be given
concerning how to get the property back,"6 for state laws created a
procedure that was sufficient.'
Finally, I will discuss American Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan,69
in which there is a discussion at the very end of Judge Renquist's
opinion about procedural due process."' American Mutual
Insurance involved a Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation law
which provided that an insurance company/employer only had to
159 See, infra, note 112.
'60 119 S.Ct. 678 (1999).
161 id-
162 id.
'63 Id. at 679.
164 id
165 id
'66 Id. at 680-81 (holding that "the City was required to give respondents
notice of the state procedures for return of seized property and the information
necessary to invoke those procedures...").
167 Id. at 681-82 (explaining that "Once the property owner is informed that his
property has been seized, he can turn to [available state statutes and case law] to
learn about remedial procedures available to him. The City need not take other
steps to inform him of his options").
'6 119 S.Ct. at 681-82 (1999).
169 119 S.Ct. 977 (1999).
' 70 Id. at 989-90.
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pay reasonable and necessary medical expenses.'' This law
allowed an insurance company to refuse to make payments and
instead invoke a utilization review procedure.
The individual sued claiming that he should have been given due
process, notice and a hearing with regard to the failure to pay his
medical expenses. 73 The Supreme Court held that there was no
state action so the Constitution did not apply. 74 The Supreme
Court then went on anyway and discussed procedural due
process. 75
The court said here that the individuals did not have a property
interest in having their medical bills paid because the law only
gave them a right to have reasonable and necessary medical bills
paid.'76 They do not have a property interest in having non-
necessary medical bills paid.'"
Well, a couple of things trouble me about this analysis. First,
once the Supreme Court held that there was no state action, and
that the Constitution and procedural due process were not
applicable, there would be no occasion for the Supreme Court to
go and in essence gratuitously talk about the procedural due
process issue.
Second, the procedural due process analysis is troubling. The
question of whether or not the medical expenses are reasonable and
171 Id. at 980.
172 Id. at 982 (stating that the Pennsylvania statute "created a 'utilization
review' procedure under which the reasonableness and necessity of an
employee's past, ongoing, or prospective medical treatment could be reviewed
before a medical bill must be paid").
173 Id. at 984 (noting that "[r]espondents alleged that in withholding workers'
compensation benefits without predeprivation notice and an opportunity to be
heard, the state and private defendants, acting 'under color of state law',
deprived them of property in violation of due process").
119 S.Ct. at 989 (1999) (concluding that "[w]e conclude that an insurer's
decision to withhold payment and seek utilization review of the reasonableness
and necessity of particular medical treatment is not fairly attributable to the
State").
'75 Id. at 989-90.
176 Id. (explaining that "[w]hile [the respondents] indeed have established
their initial eligibility for medical treatment, they have yet to make good on their
claim that the particular medical treatment they received was reasonable and
necessary. Consequently, they do not have a property interest.. .in having their
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necessary is the issue to be litigated, assuming that there was state
action. The patient is saying, "This is a necessary medical
expense." The employer and insurance company is saying, "This
isn't a necessary medical expense." For the Supreme Court to say
no procedural due process is required if it is not a necessary
medical expen§e is for the Supreme Court to assume the answer to
the very question being litigated. The court is assuming that the
defendant is going to win (e.g., it is automatically not a necessary
medical expense) when the whole point of the plaintiff is that it is a
necessary medical expense and state law gives the right. So it is a
very puzzling procedural due process analysis.
In conclusion, procedural due process issues can arise in a
variety of circumstances. The structure of the analysis is clear, but
much else remains uncertain.
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